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STATE COURT DIVERSITY AND ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINE
Nancy Leong*
INTRODUCTION
State supreme courts are the ultimate arbiters of attorney behavior for
members of the state bar. While state supreme courts generally oversee an
office of attorney regulation that handles the intake, investigation, and some
adjudication of disciplinary complaints, each state supreme court is
potentially the final decision maker regarding possible sanctions for attorney
behavior.
In many states, however, the state supreme court bar is substantially less
diverse along lines of race and gender than the state bar it regulates.1 The
disparity is even greater in comparison to the overall population of the states.2
As of February 2020, twenty-three states have an all-white supreme court,3
including twelve states in which people of color comprise at least 20 percent
of the state population.4 Similarly, fourteen states have only one woman on
their highest courts.5
This Essay considers the implications for attorney regulation of the lack of
racial and gender equity on many state supreme courts. Drawing on social
science data and research about judicial decision-making, it suggests that
demographic differences in perception and judgment may affect adjudication
of some disciplinary disputes, particularly those involving allegations of
racial or gender bias or of racial or sexual harassment. In light of the
American Bar Association’s addition of Model Rule 8.4(g)—which
* William M. Beaney Memorial Research Chair and Professor of Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law. This Essay was prepared for the Colloquium entitled The Judicial
Role in Professional Regulation, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for
Law and Ethics on October 9, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful for
the exceptional research assistance of Matt Bulow and Lauren Colantonio.
1. See Alicia Bannon & Janna Adelstein, State Supreme Court Diversity—February
2020 Update, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/state-supreme-court-diversity-february-2020-update
[https://perma.cc/66T7-G3R6].
2. Id.
3. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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implicates identity-based discrimination—to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, such an inquiry is particularly timely.6
This Essay proceeds in three parts. In the first part, it introduces
demographic data relating to state supreme courts, the bars they regulate, and
the populations they serve. It then turns to the literature regarding perceptual
disparities among members of different groups and the influence of identity
on judicial decision-making. The final part focuses on the attorney complaint
process itself. While that process proceeds almost entirely in secrecy in many
states, this Essay suggests some reasonable inferences from available
information.
This Essay concludes with two proposals, one obvious and one less so.
The obvious proposal is that those charged with composing state supreme
courts should attend to the demographic composition of the court as one
consideration, as evidence indicates that the demographic composition of
courts can have substantive consequences.7 The less obvious proposal is that
attorney disciplinary proceedings should not operate in secrecy. In addition
to the many other concerns with secret proceedings,8 they serve to obscure
potential racial and gender disparities in who is sanctioned and why.
I. DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY
Many state supreme courts are not diverse along lines of either race or
gender, both in an absolute sense and when compared to the membership of
the state bar and the population of the state as a whole.9 Yet relatively little
research has systematically examined courts’ demographics or compared
those demographics to the demographics of the pools from which state

6. Model Rule 8.4(g) states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation,
gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the
practice of law.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
7. The implementation of this proposal may vary quite a bit depending on who is charged
with composing the state supreme court: in states where the state supreme court justices are
appointed, it may be relatively easy to introduce demographic diversity as a consideration if
the relevant decision makers are willing to do so. In states where the justices are elected—
particularly in a partisan fashion, as in Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Texas—a shift toward greater diversity may be more challenging. Yet,
even in those states, a shift may not be impossible. When a vacancy arises in a state with
partisan elections, a governor may choose to appoint a justice who increases the diversity of
the bench. In Texas, for example, the first Black justice, Wallace Jefferson, was appointed by
Governor Rick Perry in 2001. Wallace Jefferson’s Biography, VOTE SMART, https://
justfacts.votesmart.org/candidate/biography/59079/wallace-jefferson [https://perma.cc/R5NZ
-Y5GL ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
8. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 1 (2007) (observing that “remarkably little is known about the effectiveness of
lawyer discipline or the fairness of the discipline systems” because in most jurisdictions,
nearly all disciplinary information is private).
9. Bannon & Adelstein, supra note 1.
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supreme court justices are drawn. This part briefly surveys the demographics
of state supreme courts and the constituencies they regulate and serve.
A brief note on terminology is in order: in discussing primary research,
this Essay adopts the demographic identifiers used by those who performed
the research. For example, “African American” versus “Black,” “female”
versus “woman,” and so forth.
A. State Supreme Courts
State supreme courts are composed of either five, seven, or nine justices,
and the justices are selected in a variety of ways, including gubernatorial
appointment, legislative appointment, nonpartisan election, and partisan
election.10 In February 2020, the Brennan Center for Justice updated an
extensive report about diversity on state supreme courts.11 Its researchers
observed that “[a] diverse bench is crucial to achieving a fair system of justice
and promoting public trust in our courts.”12
Yet the diversity of state supreme courts differs considerably from one
state to the next, and in many states the lack of racial and gender
representation is stark. As of February 2020, the supreme courts of twentythree states consisted only of white people,13 and twelve of those states have
populations consisting of at least 20 percent people of color.14
A similar pattern appears in relation to gender: fourteen state supreme
courts have only one woman.15 With minor variations, the population of
most states is about half men and half women.16
Combining the data on race and gender diversity is also illuminating. Four
state supreme courts in states where the general population is at least 20
10. See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account:
Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629,
1645–47 (2010) (collecting information from official sources).
11. Bannon & Adelstein, supra note 1.
12. Id. All information in this section is drawn from the Brennan Center report. Previous
researchers have also done important work and examined more dimensions of identity. See,
e.g., Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State Supreme
Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1203 (2009). However, this Essay relies on the Brennan
Center report as the most recent complete study regarding race and gender on state supreme
courts.
13. See Bannon & Adelstein, supra note 1.
14. Id. These states were: Alabama (35 percent), Alaska (40 percent), Arkansas (28
percent), Indiana (21 percent), Kansas (24 percent), Michigan (25 percent), Nebraska (21
percent), Nevada (51 percent), Pennsylvania (24 percent), Rhode Island (28 percent),
Tennessee (26 percent), and Utah (22 percent). Id.
15. Id. These states were: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Utah. Id. The Brennan Center report actually states that Florida’s seven-member
supreme court included zero women. Id. However, Justice Jamie R. Grosshans was appointed
on
Sept.
14,
2020.
Justice
Jamie
R.
Grosshans,
FLA. SUP. CT.,
https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/Justices/Justice-Jamie-R.-Grosshans [https://perma.cc/
WPF8-VP3W] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
16. Hunter Schwarz, In Most States, Women Outnumber Men, WASH POST. (Nov. 14,
2014, 11:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/11/10/in-moststates-women-outnumber-men/ [https://perma.cc/WB6V-73ND].
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percent nonwhite include only white people and only one woman.17 These
states are: Alaska, Indiana, Rhode Island, and Utah.18 Finally, thirty-three
state supreme courts include no women of color.19
B. The Populations State Supreme Courts Serve
Precise data on the demographics of the bar membership of each state are
difficult to obtain. Some states keep detailed records, which they make
readily available on their websites; others offer only outdated information,
present information opaquely, or do not make it available at all.20 To some
degree the challenge is logistical: the membership of a bar is inherently fluid,
with attorneys seeking admission both through bar examination and
reciprocity; moving between active and inactive status for a variety of
reasons; and retiring or otherwise leaving practice. And to retreat one step
further, the demographics of the population at large also do not explain
apparent disparities in the racial and gender makeup of the bar.
With those caveats, neither gender disparities in the membership of the bar
nor in the general population appear to explain fully the disparities at the state
supreme court level. Nearly every state has roughly the same number of men
and women. In many instances, there are disparities in the bar membership,
which are then magnified at the supreme court level. In Florida, for example,
the state bar reports its membership as 61 percent male and 39 percent
female.21 With one female supreme court justice out of seven, the supreme
court is 14 percent female.22 Similarly, in Alaska, the population is 47.7
percent female and 52.3 percent male, but the bar is 37.8 percent female and
62.2 percent male.23 Following the same trend, just one out of five supreme
court justices—20 percent—is female.24
A similar pattern emerges with respect to race. In Michigan, about 25
percent of the population consists of people of color.25 The bar is whiter—
people of color are approximately 18 percent of active resident members of
17. See Bannon & Adelstein, supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., MARGOT BOTSFORD ET AL., SUP. JUD. CT. STEERING COMM. ON LAW. WELLBEING, SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STEERING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER WELL-BEING REPORT TO
THE JUSTICES 24 (2019),
https://www.mass.gov/doc/supreme-judicial-court-steeringcommittee-on-lawyer-well-being-report-to-the-justices/download
[https://perma.cc/9J9PQU2A] (recommending that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court begin collecting
demographic data regarding the state’s attorneys).
21. FLA. BAR, RESULTS OF THE 2018 ECONOMICS AND LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT SURVEY
63 (2019), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2019/03/2018-Economics-SurveyReport-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7VM-ZECQ].
22. See
Florida
Supreme
Court
Justices,
FLA.
SUP.
CT.,
https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/Justices [https://perma.cc/NKX2-HZYH] (last visited
Jan. 27, 2021).
23. Member Statistics, ALASKA BAR ASS’N, https://alaskabar.org/for-lawyers/memberstatistics [https://perma.cc/3F39-7JL7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
24. Id.
25. See QuickFacts:
Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/MI [https://perma.cc/PYD3-N9LW] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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the bar26—and there are no people of color on the Michigan Supreme
Court.27
The pattern that emerges in Florida, Alaska, Michigan, and several other
states is that the bar is disproportionately white and male compared to the
population of the state as a whole. In turn, the state supreme court is
disproportionately white and male compared to the bar. This pattern is not
universal, but it is consistent among several states. It reveals that the lack of
racial and gender diversity on state supreme courts is not simply replicating
existing disparities in the broader population.
II. DIVERSITY AND ATTORNEY REGULATION
Demographic diversity can affect both the process and outcome of dispute
resolution. The effect of diversity arises in part from the different
perspectives of members of different demographic groups.
Russell Robinson powerfully illustrates a concept that he calls “perceptual
segregation”—that white and nonwhite people, and especially white people
and Black people, often interpret the same events differently and that the
same is true of men and women.28 As he explains: “Both insiders and
outsiders have perceptual limitations, which may obscure their ability to
ascertain discrimination.”29 Robinson argues that these differences in
perception can affect interpersonal relationships among romantic partners,
friends, and coworkers.30 Although the question has not been directly
examined, one might reasonably hypothesize that differences in perception
likewise affect interactions among state supreme court justices. More to the
point, if there are no people of color on a state supreme court—as is the case
in twenty-three states31—that might affect their decision-making processes,
too.
Survey evidence likewise reveals a disparity in perspectives between
people of different races and between men and women regarding workplace
equality.32 A Pew Research Center poll found that 63 percent of women
believed that they experienced gender-based obstacles to progress, while
only 41 percent of men believed the same of women.33 Beyond the
26. STATE BAR OF MICH., 2019–2020 STATEWIDE AND COUNTY DEMOGRAPHICS 2 (2019–
2020), https://www.michbar.org/file/opinions/statewidedemographics2019.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/B26E-3XJQ].
27. See Justices:
2019 Michigan Supreme Court Bench, MICH. CTS.,
https://courts.michigan.gov/courts/michigansupremecourt/justices/pages/default.aspx
[https:// perma.cc/C74V-YL94] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
28. See generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1117–39 (2008).
29. Id. at 1139.
30. Id.
31. See Bannon & Adelstein, supra note 1.
32. Id. at 1106–17 (collecting research).
33. Hannah Fingerhut, In Both Parties, Men and Women Differ Over Whether Women
Still Face Obstacles to Progress, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/16/in-both-parties-men-and-women-differover-whether-women-still-face-obstacles-to-progress [https://perma.cc/9TAB-UAZW].
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workplace, the perceptual gap persists. When asked whether men or women
“have it easier” in the United States today, 41 percent of women but only 28
percent of men believed that men have it easier, while 14 percent of men but
only 5 percent of women believe that women have it easier.34
This disparity extends to the legal profession. While for the past few
decades men and women have graduated from law school in approximately
equal numbers,35 the percentage of women grows smaller at each successive
professional level: for example, as of 2017, women are only about 19 percent
of equity partners and 5 percent of managing partners at the top 200 U.S. law
firms.36
The disparity in perspectives extends to sexual harassment. Nationally,
approximately 25 percent of women in the legal profession reported sexual
harassment when such behavior was defined as “unwanted sexual comments,
physical contact, and/or romantic advances,”37 and one in ten women of color
and one in eight white women reported that they lost career opportunities
“because they rejected sexual advances in the workplace.38 By contrast, only
7 percent of white men and 11 percent of men of color reported sexual
harassment.39
White people have different experiences from people of color, and men
have different experiences from women. A lifetime of such differences leads
to a difference in the way that the two groups see the world. And when one
perspective is disproportionately represented, disputes are likely to be
disproportionately resolved consistent with that group’s perception. In
particular, group dynamics are likely to influence the decision-making
process, sometimes along demographic lines.40
Researchers have uncovered concrete differences in the relationship
between demographics and dispute resolution. A study of 1666 cases
involving claims of sexual harassment or sex discrimination revealed that
female judges decided for plaintiffs more often than did male judges.41
34. Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Wide Partisan Gaps in U.S. over How Far the
Country Has Come on Gender Equality, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/10/18/wide-partisan-gaps-in-u-s-over-how-far-thecountry-has-come-on-gender-equality [https://perma.cc/V7WM-PN9N].
35. Destiny Peery, Number of Women Equity Partners in Law Firms Maintains a Slow
and Steady Pace, ANN. SURV. REP. (Nat’l Ass’n of Women Laws., Chi., Ill.), 2017, at 1, 2.
36. Id. at 2.
37. JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., AM. BAR. ASS’N, YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T
SEE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INTERRUPTING RACIAL & GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
9 (2018); see also Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual
Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-retires.html [https://perma.cc/2DPK-4RGW].
38. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 37, at 9–10.
39. Id. at 9.
40. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82 (1986).
41. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1777 (2005) (“[T]he
results indicate that both liberal and conservative female judges were more likely than their
male counterparts to support plaintiffs.”).
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Moreover, male judges on panels with at least one female judge decided in
favor of plaintiffs more than twice as often as those on all-male panels.42
Importantly, while ideology43 also influenced outcomes, the gender makeup
of panels mattered more than ideology.44
III. STATE SUPREME COURT DIVERSITY IN ATTORNEY REGULATION
The literature on the influence of demographic diversity on perceptions
and dispute resolution suggests that the racial and gender composition of state
supreme courts matters to the resolution of disputes in at least three ways.
First, the composition of state supreme courts may affect whether and to what
extent attorneys who are women or people of color are disciplined for alleged
misconduct. Second, state supreme court diversity may influence the
adjudication of complaints involving conduct with a racial, sexual, or
gendered dimension. And finally, the composition of state supreme courts
may influence the interpretation and application of state analogs to Model
Rule 8.4(g), a relatively new rule that deals explicitly with racial and
gendered bias and harassment and whose interpretation is still evolving.
A. Diversity and Empathy
The research described in Part II confirms an intuition that many people
share: people tend to empathize more with those to whom they relate,45 and
people—including judges—are more likely to relate to those who share their
race and gender characteristics.46 Social science research demonstrates such
a connection. For example, one study concluded that observers reacted more
strongly to pain suffered by people who shared their racial identities.47 The
research makes intuitive sense. One study found that 75 percent of white
Americans report that “the network of people with whom they discuss
important matters is entirely white.”48 If people are more likely to interact

42. Id. at 1778.
43. Ideology was determined, in part, by using the party of the president who appointed
the judge as a proxy.
44. Peresie, supra note 41, at 1178–79.
45. See, e.g., Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of
Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693, 722–23 (2014); Robinson, supra note 28, at 1120–21,
1133, 1136.
46. See, e.g., Negowetti, supra note 45, at 696, 717–19 (“[J]udges, like everyone else, are
the product of their race, ethnicity, nationality, socioeconomic status, gender, sexuality,
religion, and ideology.”).
47. See, e.g., Alessio Avenanti et al., Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor
Resonance with Other-Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018, 1019–20 (2010); see also
Matteo Forgiarini et al., Racism and the Empathy for Pain on Our Skin, FRONTIERS IN PSYCH.,
May 2011, at 1, 4, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00108/full
[https://perma.cc/QE93-8EUZ] (reporting that “the extent to which Caucasian observers share
the pain experience of other people is affected by the race of the person in pain” (citation
omitted)).
48. Daniel Cox et al., Race, Religion, and Political Affiliation of Americans’ Core Social
Networks, PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.prri.org/research/poll-racereligion-politics-americans-social-networks [https://perma.cc/GS3H-FFT3].
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with members of their own racial groups, those shared experiences may breed
greater empathy for those within their groups.
Empirical data on the relationship between in-group empathy and attorney
regulation is scarce. Yet a substantial body of research supports in-group
empathy49 as a possible explanation, or as one of several explanations, for
potential disparities in the frequency and severity of attorney discipline.
Such considerations would be profitably explored in a regime of greater
transparency.50
Data from both New Mexico and Illinois are suggestive: the attorney
regulatory entities in both states have conducted research revealing that in
the respective state bars, African American and Hispanic attorneys are
disproportionately sanctioned, as compared to their representation in the
bar.51 A number of factors influence this disparity. For example, an
important factor in determining whether lawyers receive sanctions is the size
of the firm with which they practice. Solo practitioners and attorneys at
midsize firms are more likely to receive sanctions than those who practice
with large firms, and solo practitioners and attorneys at midsize firms are also
more likely to be people of color.52
Nonetheless, the disproportionate likelihood that attorneys of color will
receive sanctions bears examination in light of the composition of state
supreme courts. And even if the sanction disparity is fully explained by
nonracial factors, perceptions also matter, and available evidence indicates
that attorneys of color have less confidence in the disciplinary review
process. For example, a survey by the Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission found that 38.9 percent of white lawyers believe
that attorney discipline is very fair, while only 28 percent of Black lawyers
expressed the same belief.53

49. See, e.g., DAVID KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (describing,
generally, the operation of implicit bias); Negowetti, supra note 45, at 705–14 (collecting
studies).
50. See Jacquelyn M. Desch, Attorney Discipline Online, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 921,
921 (2016) (“As legal proceedings move further and further online, why should lawyers
remain behind in the relative anonymity and unobtainability of hard copy and
confidentiality?”); Levin, supra note 8, at 32–49.
51. See ARTHUR J. JARAMILLO & MARY ANN SHAENING, THE STATE BAR OF N.M. TASK
FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PRO. II, REPORT, THE STATUS OF MINORITY ATTORNEYS
IN NEW MEXICO—AN UPDATE 11, 43–46 (1990–1999), https://www.nmbar.org/nmbardocs/
pubres/reports/minoritytaskforcereportupdate.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2S3-A28E] (revealing
that between 1988 and1998, Hispanic attorneys were only 13 to 17 percent of all active
attorneys but received 26 percent of serious sanctions); BENEDICT SCHWARZ II ET AL., ATT’Y
REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM’N OF THE SUP. CT. OF ILL, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION (2003), https://www.iardc.org/
AnnualReport03/2003main_annreport.html [https://perma.cc/P4S7-DDBR] (revealing that 11
percent of attorneys sanctioned were Black, while bar passage statistics indicate that the
percentage of Black attorneys is 4.9 percent).
52. Id.
53. Levin, supra note 8, at 7 n.38. It is worth noting that the confidence in fairness seems
rather low regardless of race—although this is a matter for a different paper.
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B. When Identity Is at Issue
The demographic composition of state supreme courts may also influence
the courts’ decision-making when race or gender is an explicit part of the
facts comprising the complaint. Evidence from the sexual harassment
context, discussed in Part II, reveals that three-judge appellate panels
including women are more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs on
nondispositive motions.54 It does not seem implausible that the same would
be true in the context of attorney disciplinary measures involving racial or
gendered conduct, as well. That is, the demographics of a particular state
supreme court may influence the content of its decisions.
All-white and all- or nearly all-male state supreme courts have imposed
sanctions on attorneys for racist or sexist behavior in a number of cases.55
Yet this does not resolve the question of whether more diverse tribunals
might resolve matters of attorney discipline differently. Given currently
available information, the question is unanswerable given that most states
maintain secrecy for most disciplinary records. Moreover, most of the
publicly available instances of conduct relating to race or gender involve
conduct that is arguably either criminal or illegal. Many would argue that we
should hold lawyers to a standard higher than avoiding the literal commission
of crimes.
We gain a limited window into what state supreme courts do not consider
sanction worthy from the small subset of publicly available decisions. For
example, the Indiana Supreme Court—one of the state supreme courts whose
justices include only one woman—held that an attorney did not violate Model
Rule 8.4(g) when he became romantically interested in a woman who was a
summer intern, grew angry when she did not reciprocate his advances, and
sent a film clip in which the woman was in a “state of undress,” first to an
attorney at her firm and then to a wider audience.56 The court’s reasoning
was that the attorney’s conduct did not demonstrate bias or prejudice against
women in general, only anger at the specific woman in question.57 The
Delaware Supreme Court has not adopted Model Rule 8.4(g). However, in a
2018 case, the court referenced a comment to Model Rule 8 addressing
discrimination and held that the rule was not violated when an attorney sent
emails stating that female opposing counsel had “no ‘brain wave activity’”58
and speculating crudely about opposing counsel’s plans for Valentine’s Day
with her husband59 and also stated to male opposing counsel: “You are
54. Peresie, supra note 41, at 1777.
55. See, e.g., In re Thomsen, 837 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ind. 2005) (per curiam). In this
case, the attorney representing the husband in the divorce matter referred to the wife’s new
boyfriend as “the black guy” and insinuated that the reason dead animals had been left on the
porch was due to “the black man” in the house. Id.
56. In re Usher, 987 N.E.2d 1080, 1083–84, 1086 (Ind. 2013).
57. Id. at 1089. One might reasonably question whether it is possible to disentangle bias
and prejudice against women from sufficiently egregious conduct toward a woman.
58. In re Member of Bar Hurley, 183 A.3d 703 (Del. 2018), No. 383, 2018 WL 1319010,
at *2 (Del. Mar. 14, 2018) (unpublished table decision).
59. Id.
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outmanned and outgunned. I am Catholic. You’re not. You’re a young
Jewish man, I suspect.”60 Indeed, sometimes state supreme courts decline to
sanction attorneys even for literal crimes.61
And even when state supreme courts hold an attorney accountable for
particular behavior, they sometimes reject other concerning behavior as not
worthy of sanction. In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Young,62 an attorney was not
sanctioned for calling one female attorney a “cute girl” and hugging her
several times,63 nor was he sanctioned for asking a different employee
whether she had a boyfriend; although the court did impose punishment for
other conduct it deemed sufficiently severe.64
Moreover, the fact that some attorneys are punished for conduct relating
to race or gender does not dispense with the question of whether it would
happen to the same extent, in the aggregate, were the demographic
composition of state supreme courts more reflective of the states’ bars and
constituencies. Many attorney disciplinary proceedings happen in secret,65
with the results not made public unless discipline is imposed66—meaning
sometimes we see only the cases in which state supreme courts chose to
punish the attorney, not the cases in which the courts declined to do so.
Available evidence reveals that far more cases do not result in discipline than
those that do—Florida, for instance, reports that each year the state bar opens
approximately 4000 discipline files, resulting in punishment of up to 300
people.67 While this Essay does not necessarily advocate for more punitive
measures, a sanction rate of approximately 7.5 percent in Florida
demonstrates that there are many cases that do not rise to the level of
punishment: the rate might be different—in either direction—if the decision
makers were different.

60. Id. The court held that the emails violated Delaware Lawyers’ Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.4(a) because the emails had “‘no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay
or burden’ opposing counsel.” Id. at *3 (quoting DEL. LAWS.’ PRO. CONDUCT R. 4.4(a)). The
court imposed only a public reprimand and a requirement that the attorney attend training
sessions—even after the attorney circulated a twenty-three-page document called “My
Struggle, also known as ‘Hurleygate’” to many members of the Delaware bar and bench. Id.
Despite the fairly obvious connotations of the phrasing “my struggle,” the Delaware Supreme
Court chose not to see the attorney’s behavior through the lens of identity. Id.
61. See, e.g., In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Stoneburner, 882 N.W.2d 200,
202 (Minn. 2016) (declining to hold that an attorney’s conviction for misdemeanor assaultfear against his wife warranted professional discipline). In Stoneburner, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota did hold that Stoneburner’s related conviction for interference with a 911 call
warranted discipline, but the punishment imposed was a public reprimand. Id. at 207.
62. 731 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio 2000).
63. Id. at 636.
64. Id. at 642.
65. Only Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia treat all or nearly all
complaints about lawyers as a matter of public record. Levin, supra note 8, at 19.
66. Id.
67. Attorney
Discipline,
FLA.
BAR,
https://www.floridabar.org/public/acap
[https://perma.cc/3ZKX-WQXX] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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C. Diversity and Model Rule 8.4(g)
Finally, the interpretation of any and all state versions of Model Rule
8.4(g) will fall to state supreme courts, and therefore the composition of state
supreme courts may play a role in how the rule is construed from state to
state. Model Rule 8.4(g) was adopted by the American Bar Association’s
House of Delegates in 2016.68 The rule states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status
in conduct related to the practice of law.69

The adoption of the rule caused considerable controversy, the substance of
which is mostly beyond the scope of the discussion here.70 Thus far only a
few states have adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) without significant changes,
while others encode antibias provisions elsewhere in their rules of
professional conduct.71
For present purposes, the important point is that a state supreme court that
is diverse along race and gender lines might interpret such a rule—whether
Model Rule 8.4(g) itself or some modified equivalent—differently than
would a state supreme court that is all white and mostly male.72 The
distinction is perhaps particularly relevant given that in an interracial
complaint or in most gender-based complaints, a given justice will probably
identify demographically with either the lawyer named or the complainant
but probably not both. Rebecca Aviel has cogently emphasized the
importance of reading Model Rule 8.4(g) and its various state
implementations in the context of a particular victim so as not to run up
68. Kristin A. Kubes et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate
Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in the Practice of Law, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 12,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_
construction/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4 [https://perma.cc/DN8U-FUCW].
69. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
70. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing
Between Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (2018); Josh
Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 241 (2017); Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice:
A Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195 (2017);
Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g):
Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL PRO.
201 (2017) (arguing that the new model rule requires serious First Amendment analysis).
71. See Fifty State Survey (Oct. 8, 2020) (unpublished dataset) (on file with author).
72. There is no corollary to Model Rule 8.4(g) in the American Bar Association’s Model
Code of Judicial Conduct. Given what we have learned about judicial behavior in the past
few years, see, e.g., Chokshi, supra note 37, and the inability of many jurists to affirm that
foundational cases of racial equality, such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), were correctly decided, see Laura Meckler & Robert Barnes, Trump Judicial
Nominees Decline to Endorse Brown v. Board Under Senate Questioning, WASH. POST (May
16,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-judicial-nomineesdecline-to-endorse-brown-v-board-under-senate-questioning/2019/05/16/d5409d58-773211e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html [https://perma.cc/9WL9-HZCF], the inclusion of such
a rule is not just necessary but overdue.
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against First Amendment issues.73 This construction offers an even clearer
invitation to a justice to see the lawyer and complainant as individuals—with
all the benefits and demographic baggage that individuation brings.
Particularly given the strong feelings triggered by the #MeToo movement,
sexual harassment is likely to produce a particularly marked divide along
lines of gender. Judges—particularly male judges—might themselves worry
that they have crossed some line in the past, particularly given the highprofile sanction of jurists such as former judge Alex Kozinski.74 Yet as data
in the previous section indicate, many attorneys, particularly women, believe
that sexual harassment in the legal profession is a serious problem that
requires redress.75 One vehicle for redress could be a state analog to Model
Rule 8.4(g)—which might be more feasible for victims than a Title VII
lawsuit—and the overall interpretation of that provision, as well as the results
in individual cases could well be influenced by the composition of a court
itself.76
The various identity categories occupied by state supreme court justices
might not matter for their decisions in any individual case of attorney
regulation or discipline. In the aggregate, however, in many factual
circumstances, across many cases, the composition of state supreme courts
may influence attorney regulation. The cases in which discipline is imposed,
the scope and nature of such discipline, and the broader interpretation of
statutes are all potentially influenced by the membership of the courts
construing the relevant provisions. Diversity of state supreme courts is more
than mere optics: it is a feature of the attorney regulation system that carries
substantive consequences as well.
CONCLUSION
This Essay offers two prescriptions: an easy one and a hard one. The easy
conclusion of this Essay is to call for more diversity in state supreme courts.
The more challenging conclusion is that pervasive secrecy may impede
diversity by preventing examination of the ways in which diversity might
make a difference. As Leslie C. Levin has observed, the difficulty in
evaluating the effectiveness and fairness of attorney discipline “is
compounded by the fact that in many jurisdictions, discipline complaints,
discipline files, and even many discipline sanctions are private.”77 In
addition to the shield from public accountability that these measures provide,
73. Aviel, supra note 70, at 55–56. Such First Amendment issues are beyond the scope
of this Essay.
74. Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual
Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/
12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/PKJ7-VL2C].
75. Id.
76. See generally Leah E. Smith, Lawyers Too: Addressing Sexual Harassment in the
Legal Field Through the Rules of Professional Responsibility, 41 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 194
(2020).
77. Levin, supra note 8, at 1.
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they also mask the extent to which disparities in attorney discipline may be
traceable to other demographic disparities. Particularly in matters related to
discrimination itself, diversity and transparency work in tandem to shape the
ways in which attorneys are regulated, including by the supreme courts of the
states.

